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000 Church tended to lead an inactive life of asceticism aimed at personal salvation.¹

721 However, from the seventeenth century on, Russia's expansion, which was earlier oriented mainly toward the East, turned
642 westward. The wars with the West which heretofore were mainly defensive, tended to acquire an increasingly offensive character. But the wars with the advanced Western countries were more difficult and much more costly than those with the economically and technologically backward Asiatics. The defeats which Russia suffered at the hands of the Swedes and Poles made it imperative for the Czars to increase the military effectiveness of their country to meet the challenge. This need dictated changes in the internal structure of the Czardom, in the direction of administrative and industrial advance along European patterns. Even before Peter the Great, measures had been taken in this direction. [643] But it was Peter who dramatized the issue by himself going abroad as an apprentice in Western industries to become "the first carpenter of the Empire."

• 647 In accordance with such need the old system of administration
565 based on service nobility was replaced by a system of salaried
555 officials (*chinovnichestvo*). According to this *chin* (civil rank) system which was introduced by Peter the Great and which followed the Western pattern it was no longer necessary to belong to the *dvorianstvo* class in order to obtain state service. On the contrary, any one who served faithfully and efficiently could rise in *chin* and rank and thus obtain the status of a hereditary or of a personal *dvoryanin*, without even owning land. In this way a new salaried military and bureaucratic caste, entirely dependent upon the Czar, was growing at the expense of the landed *dvorianstvo*. As a result, the *dvoryanin*-guardsman, the chief state functionary of the eighteenth century, was replaced by the *chinovnik*-commoner in the nineteenth century. *Chinovnichestvo* absorbed and replaced *dvorianstvo*—just as earlier the *dvorianstvo* had absorbed and replaced *boyarstvo*. Now bureaucracy instead of military nobility became the main instrument of governing.²

647 This change in the structure of the Czardom, however, was
642 accomplished from above, that is, by means of imperial decrees,

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not by means of a popular revolution as in the West. Accordingly the new bureaucratic rule was based on the *Ukaz*² and the knut as much as the old order. For the same reason, though the state was formally secularized, the traditions of an autocracy, divinely ordained and supported by God, were carried on by every official as the representative of the Czar.⁴

Therefore the new system of autocracy based on bureaucracy, the same as the old one based on service nobility, could not recognize any political or personal rights of the subjects. Nor could there have developed any *esprit de corps* among the new governing class. This new class of officials owned little or no land and had to live on meager salaries, but was eager to follow the traditions and the high standards established by the old landed nobility. The *chinovnichestvo* therefore became even more dependent upon the Czar than the *dvorianstvo* was earlier. There was even less *esprit de corps* and less solidarity in the new governing class than in the old. Each official was constantly in fear of jeopardizing his own social position if he stood up in defense of any of his colleagues. Besides, in this hierarchical system of power the ruin or falling into disfavor of one official often meant the ascendancy of the other. There was, therefore, a tendency to take advantage of such a situation, to resort to intrigues and calumnies, and to help to destroy rather than to rehabilitate a victim.

All the powers, the lawmaking, the application of law, and the justice were placed into the hands of these bureaucrats. At the same time the system of checks and controls was very deficient. Laws were enacted by special temporary commissions of high officials, and created *ad hoc*. The Council of State, a supreme policy-making body, composed of about seventy to eighty highest dignitaries, was appointed by the Czar to serve him only in advisory capacities. The final decision rested in the hands of the Czar, or with the *camarilla clique* which happened at the moment to be most influential. The Empire was administratively divided into provinces (*gubernia*) which were usually headed by army generals. The *gubernias* were divided into districts which were headed by chiefs of police. The governors, supported by the police, ruled autocratically in their domains. They were

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625 responsible only to the Czar; and the police, not being responsible to the public, but only to their immediate superiors, tended to be arbitrary.

647 What mattered in Russia's bureaucratic system was obedience to one's superiors. That was the primary criterion of judgment of the fitness of a civil servant, not his ability or personal integrity. Seldom was an employee dismissed because of corruption and injustice. A functionary could not be prosecuted for acts committed in the exercise of his functions except with the consent, or, on the initiative of his superiors. And the higher placed the offender, the less real was his responsibility. At the same time a subordinate employee, a soldier, or an inferior officer had no redress if wronged by his superior. A subordinate did have the right by law to lodge a complaint against mistreatment on the part of his chief, but according to the rules of Russian hierarchical discipline, no public servant, civil or military, could present a petition or complaint except through his own superior officer.⁵ Few ever dared to do so.

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871 This bureaucratic irresponsibility and impunity assumes an especial significance if one has in mind the low status of education and training of Russian officials. By the end of the nineteenth century in the provinces, according to an official investigation, out of a hundred employees, only one or two were found to have attended a university, five or six to have graduated from secondary schools, ten or twelve from primary schools. Eighty out of a hundred had had no formal schooling whatever and had passed no examination.⁶ Many former soldiers and war veterans with little or no formal schooling crowded civil administration. At times the higher the education the less chances one had to enter state service.⁷

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557 In such a system excess in zeal was often rewarded. On the other hand, initiative and originality, if not successful, were fraught with great personal risks. Therefore, shirking from work and responsibility, and struggling for office and rank became the rule. It was only by achieving higher position and by winning

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the favors of one's superiors that one hoped to exercise more power and to achieve a higher degree of security.

Such a situation often demanded self-abasing and cringing humility toward superiors in the hierarchy as an adjustment to a situation of permanent insecurity and threat. "... those employed believe that they can never do enough to show their zeal." "Without being base, it is impossible to get on," the officials themselves would say.⁹ At the same time, perhaps as a compensation for degradation and loss of self-respect, there developed the propensity of the officials to show haughtiness and arrogance to those below them in rank and status. "A man, as soon as he rises a grade above the common level, acquires the right . . . to maltreat his inferiors to whom it is his duty to transmit the blows that he receives from those above him."¹⁰

In such conditions preoccupation with one's self rather than interest in group ideals and objectives thrived. There was therefore a tendency for selfish and petty concerns, greediness, venality, and corruption. Careerism prevailed over loyalty. Fortunes were made by many in public service as a security for the uncertain future.¹¹ The public opinion itself supported such behavior because it was expected that people who acquire office or any other positions of trust would take personal advantage of the situation. In some departments because of the inadequacy of the salaries and in order to meet the expected high standards of living the officials were considered to have tacit permission to have recourse to illicit perquisites. Administration, justice, police, the army and the navy, and even the clergy, all had their acknowledged perquisites, which often included bribes.¹²

In such conditions in which extreme self-concern thrived, the Czar himself did not feel safe and secure. This sense of insecurity on the very peak of power was reflected, for instance, in the tendency of the Czars not to tolerate any outstanding personalities in their midst.¹³ The same feeling was reflected in the idea that any concession on the part of the Czar would be considered as a sign of weakness. The result was that the Czar was often surrounded by sycophants and careerists and had no close friends whom he could trust and on whom he could rely for support at all times. In such circumstances the Czar might feel isolated,

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554 In a similar manner revolt was brewing in the bureaucracy and the armed forces. In a system which was founded on the principles of absolute dominance, subservience and unconditional submission, it is to be expected that the civil service employees as well as many officers would be often exposed to caprice, arbitrariness and wrong doings on the part of their superiors. These, too, were left without possibility of redress as were the clergymen. Strong sense of rank and social distance were as marked in these strata as among the clergy.

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565 The lay schools were not much different in strictness and discipline from the priests' seminaries, and students in these schools were often as ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, and as exposed to the rod and other degrading treatment. The student's parents, who were often impoverished gentry, petty chinovniks, or small traders with meager incomes and big families, were not always able to support their children throughout long years of schooling. At the same time in an economically and technologically undeveloped society with strong traditions of service nobility, there was nothing that young people from such families could do but to enroll at a university or a military academy in order to obtain government office, or to engage in free learned professions. In Russian society of those days these were the only possibilities of obtaining positions of some prestige. Many of these students from impoverished strata had therefore to depend upon public or private munificence to finish their studies. Some of them became police informers to secure a meager income and to finish schooling. Many had to drop out of school because of lack of financial resources.

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668 All Russian schools, therefore, on the middle as well as on the university level, became centers of revolt against an order which exposed them to humiliating treatment, but did not offer them opportunities in accordance with the established traditions of higher classes. Hence the higher the school, the more it was imbued with the revolutionary spirit. And the words "student" and "revolutionary" became synonymous.

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641 When new laws were introduced and these ambitious and rebellious young men and women finally entered state service they found that in addition to being ill-treated and ill-paid, a

2 [i.e. in the second half of the XIXth century. - Analyst]

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large part of them were disfranchised as well, because in municipal self-government and in district and provincial assemblies even persons holding university degrees, if they did not own a sufficient amount of property, were devoid of the right of suffrage.⁴ And it was this underprivileged group of declassée nobility, of priests' sons, of former clerics, of sons and daughters of lower government employees, of unemployed professionals, of students and of former students who never had a chance to finish their studies, that became known as the *raznochintsy*.

The *raznochintsy* intelligentsia tended to lead a bohemian life and to engage in literary activities and journalism. But these vocations were greatly limited because of strict censorship laws. When the bar was established some *raznochintsy* practiced law as barristers, though they were very restricted in their activities because of traditional extra legal practices of the police. When under local self-administration (*Zemstvo*), a health, educational, and economic program for the improvement of rural areas was developed, a number of *raznochintsy* were employed by the *Zemstvo* as physicians, veterinarians, agronomists, teachers and book-keepers. At the same time, their traditions and training, and especially their ambitions and expectations had conditioned the *raznochintsy* for intellectual pursuits and political leadership, not for routine administrative work or for business promotion and enterprise.

In such a situation the deeply rooted feeling of rejection which had been developed on the family level was greatly magnified.⁵ Accordingly, self-centeredness, power-seeking, lack of trust, destructive aggression, as well as identification with suffering which were developed on the family level were heightened in these circumstances and found expression in ideologies which manifested extreme hostility and an urge for universal destruction. Many of these young rebels, for instance, denied all existing social institutions, conventions and restrictions, and demanded their total obliteration.

This ideology of extreme negation and destruction ("Nihilism") manifested, perhaps, the feelings of utter despair of the ambitious and self-seeking *raznochintsy* who felt impotent before the God-like power of the Czar and his omnipotent police.

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INSTRUMENTS OF POLITICAL CONFORMITY

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By choosing the "right" people to fill the key Party positions, by using Party *aktivs* as an instrument of vigilance and political manipulation, and by systematic periodical purges of Party members and of Party officials who do not come up to the standards set up by the Party hierarchy, the whole Party is regimented and kept in submission according to the will of one man and his innermost circle. By an efficient control of such a regimented Party the life of the whole society is manipulated since the Party members are the "leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state."⁷ It is also upon the Party's recommendation that all the important appointments in the government, managerial and military hierarchy and in learned professions are made. Hence by controlling the Party, the Party leadership is enabled to regiment the whole society and to make it dependent upon its will.

Such a Party, however, in order to perpetuate its leadership and to maintain its undisputed dominance, must preserve ideological and organizational unity, rigid discipline and *esprit de corps*.⁸ These qualities can be best achieved if the Party is limited to a small membership consisting partly of professional conspirators, agitators and political organizers, and partly of the members of government, military and managerial hierarchies. In such a Party the zealots and the careerists, specialists in conspiracy, vigilance and violence, tend to take the lead. As a result, the Party which had been originally conceived as the "vanguard of the working people," which effectively "guides" a devoted proletariat,⁹ remained instead an essentially conspiratorial institution and was bound to lose its initial intimate contact with the broad strata of the population.

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A small faction of professional conspirators, which rules in opposition to the traditionally rooted demands for egalitarian acceptance and full political and social participation, must rely on active help of experts in all fields of political organization and social control to maintain its monopoly of all power. The top hierarchies of these various strata of specialists are all trusted

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665 Party members. Together with the policy-making Party bodies
647 they form the ruling class of the Soviet society. This top Party-state governing class consists perhaps of about two hundred thousand people or one tenth of one per cent of the total population. They are often referred to as the *Partia i Pravitelstvo*—the Party and the government.

[162] The middle and lower layers of government specialists are often referred to as the *Sluzhashchie*. This stratum includes the rank and file of the learned professions, the rank and file of the intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia, the middle and lower professional military, the middle and lower government managerial ranks, the engineers and the technicians. According to the 1939 census the number of those in the *sluzhashchie* class, that is "all those who work in offices" was close to thirty million or seventeen per cent of the total Soviet population, as contrasted to the industrial labor (*rabochie*) which formed thirty-two per cent and the peasantry (*krestiane*) which formed forty-six per cent of the total.

[554] The more one goes down this social scale, the smaller becomes the proportion of Party members to non members and of the privileged to the non-privileged. One's position in this caste-like pyramid determines his status expressed not only in the form of income, but even more so in the extent to which he gets the benefits of various social services, the extent of appurtenances,¹⁰ the amount of freedom of personal movement, and the degree of superordination and subordination.

665 The privileged position of the educated and semi-educated
565 classes is well manifested in the internal structure of the Bolshevik Party. As late as 1930 about 65 percent of Party members were workers or recruited from the working class, about 20 percent were peasants or of peasant background, and less than 15 percent belonged to the white collar class. But by 1941-42 the composition of the Party was reversed and apparently at present more than 70 percent of the new candidates and members are recruited from among the educated and official classes.¹¹ The Party rules, which in the first years of Bolshevik regime had favored the industrial proletariat, and to a certain extent the soldiers and the collective peasants, had to be revised in order to

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177 *There is also a deliberate policy on the part of the ruling class*
 626 to prevent personal contact and exchange of ideas between the
 609 Soviet subjects and the foreigners. In this way the Bolshevik
 Party is performing the same role in the social and psychological
 development of Russia as the Orthodox Church has done in the
 past. Xenophobia and a deliberate avoidance of strangers easily
 develops in such circumstances, traits which have been noticed
 by all the observers of Soviet society. Xenophobia is so outstand-
 ing in the Soviet world that it has been noticed even by the most
 casual and most friendly visitors. Soviet authorities have done
 their best to encourage this feeling. "We were completely cut off
 [625] from the great bulk of the Russian people by constant police sur-
 veillance, by propaganda and by the threat of punishment."⁷
 "The air itself was clothed with hate and suspicion . . . pene-
 trated even to the child world. . . . Our next door neighbours,
 too, were grilled, and though we had known them for years, they
 took to avoiding us utterly."⁸ As a rule, only police informers are
 assigned to foreigners as servants because everyone else is afraid
 to work for them.

517 In such conditions original ideas and independent intellectual
 • 647 pursuits are fraught with great risks and it is often the less origi-
 nal, the mediocre, the cynical, the shrewd and the unscrupulous
 that take the lead. Some independent and creative people in such
 circumstances tend to become apathetic, to withdraw, to sever
 social contacts and put an end to their creative activities.⁹ Others
 tend to seek safety in bureaucratic routine and in avoidance of
 initiative and responsibility. For each decision they tend to cover
 themselves by presenting the matter to various committees, or by
 seeking the Party's advice, thus letting others shoulder the
 responsibility.

517 The social consequences of such a development are then
 665 manifested in a pronounced anti-intellectualism, bureaucratism
 and vigilantism. The ascendancy of anti-intellectualistic and
 watchdog trends in Soviet society is well expressed, for instance,
 in the change in the composition of the membership of the Polit-
 bure. In this topmost ruling body the more intellectual types of
 revolutionaries have been gradually purged and replaced by the
 activists, the semi-educated professional conspirators, Party or-
 ganizers, agitators and former security officials.

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517 newspapers, books, and pamphlets, some of which were printed
204 abroad and circulated freely though often clandestinely among
626 the leading circles of the Empire.

517 The ruling circles of the Bolshevik Party themselves were
626 always aware that without criticism intellectual stagnation, lack
of creative initiative, and bureaucratism would set in. But they
could not afford to allow complete freedom of thought and of
expression which might eventually undermine their own power.
As a result the Bolsheviks introduced a system of "criticism and
self-criticism," known as *samokritika*.

[461] According to this practice it is the duty of every Soviet subject
to criticize his own work and the work of others in his shop or
office as a means of stimulating alertness, initiative, and hard

[557] work, and as a way to correct errors. But among the officials who
closely watch each other's activities, each hoping to rise on the

● [47] cadaver of the other, *samokritika* is often used as a means of
intrigue and ruin in jockeying and struggling for ranks, posi-
tions, and power. *Samokritika* therefore has developed into a
weapon employed to detect the ideological deviations and diver-
sions and to criticize any lack of sufficiently positive attitude
toward the "Party line." In this manner "self-criticism" in the
Soviet Union has become another instrument of regimentation
and means to increase conformity.

626 Samokritika is also employed by the ruling circles to manipu-
661 late hostilities generated by the Soviet system and to direct them
away from themselves and against the managers and bureaucrats
located mostly on the lower levels of the Soviet social pyramid.
These people conveniently function as scapegoats. It is such
people who, together with a sprinkling from the higher echelons,
are periodically offered as sacrifice and "purged" or "liquidated."
Samokritika is therefore employed also as a check against abuses
of power, though mostly on the local level.

626 In an atmosphere of complete dependence upon and subordi-
154 nation to an overwhelming and infallible power which instils
782 fear and awe, the slightest deviation from the line of thought and
emotions as laid down by that distant and inscrutable force
might easily provoke anxieties, and a strong sense of guilt. In
circumstances in which one feels isolated and without support,